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Abstract 
The struggle between the contradictory objectives of security and democratic governance has 
dominated EU discourse, policies and practices when it comes to the southern bank of the 
Mediterranean since 1995. Ultimately, there is a scholarly consensus on the substantial failure of what 
had been the normative drive for setting up the partnership: no shared area of prosperity and 
democracy exists today because security concerns prevailed. As reliable partners for the EU on 
security issues, Tunisia and Morocco were crucial in entrenching the securitisation of the relationship. 
This holds true also after the uprisings, as encouraging premises quickly turned into considerable 
instability in the Middle East and North Africa.  
This study employs a borderlands approach to analysing the ways in which the EU outsources the 
management of key ‘border functions’ while attempting to connect the periphery in other issue-areas. 
More specifically, it examines the implications of the EU’s post-2011 revision of its security 
‘cooperation’ with Tunisia and Morocco for two aspects of the relationship. First, it looks at the way 
in which domestic political reconfigurations have occurred and how these reconfigurations have 
influenced relations with the EU. Second, it explores the asymmetries of power between the two 
parties and the degree of ‘leverage’ Tunisia and Morocco have vis-à-vis the EU. 
Our main contention is that the soul-searching and reflective mode of EU officials was short-lived, and 
that the rhetoric about past mistakes and new beginnings in the early days of the uprisings has not been 
matched over time. As enthusiasm for the Arab Spring faded on both sides of the Mediterranean, the 
EU reverted to a business as usual approach, demanding and obtaining the cooperation of both Tunisia 
and Morocco, irrespective of the diverging post-uprising trajectories of the two countries. 
Keywords: 
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Introduction* 
Since the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in 1995, the European Union (EU) has 
attempted to regulate its interactions with the southern bank of the Mediterranean through a number of 
different policy instruments. Contradictory objectives at the heart of such policies though seemed to 
weigh all these instruments down. On the one hand, much was always made of the normative claims to 
promote socio-economic development and democratic governance, in order to achieve long-term 
regional stability through shared prosperity and values. On the other, realpolitik imperatives - security 
and economic interests - dominated EU actions. In particular, the notion of security tended to 
dominate relations because the concept was conceived of in broad terms, ranging from anti-terrorism 
to migration and from organised crime to arms proliferation, crucially excluding however human 
security. Ultimately, realpolitik led to the failure of what had been the normative drive for setting up 
the partnership in the first place (Youngs 2006; Teti 2012) and no shared area of prosperity and 
democracy exists today.  
Both Tunisia and Morocco featured prominently as reliable partners for the EU on security issues 
related to human trafficking, counter-terrorism and migration, to the detriment of genuine democracy-
promotion delinked from EU material interests. Rather than constituting an opportunity to rethink 
seriously the relationship with the countries on the southern bank of the Mediterranean, the uprisings 
increased European concerns with their own security (Börzel et al. 2015), as the whole Middle East 
and North Africa have been plunged into considerable instability. Initially, though, the EU responded 
to the uprisings by advocating a profound reconfiguration of its assumptions and policies towards the 
region, expressing a considerable degree of self-criticism. Thus, the following question emerged: how 
would and should the EU react to the potentially revolutionary changes taking place in countries like 
Tunisia and Morocco, having relied on their authoritarian structures for its own security for a long 
time? The EU was ‘quick to recognise the challenges of the political and economic transition faced by 
the region as a whole. It … also recognised the need to adopt a new approach to relations with its 
Southern neighbours’ (European Commission 2011). This new approach never materialised because 
the narrow focus on security, as well as material interests and normative beliefs in neo-liberal 
governmentality (Tagma et al. 2013; Isleyen 2014), prevent it (Teti 2012). Quite rapidly, both 
authoritarian resilience in the region and the deteriorating security situation across North Africa made 
the EU very wary of the outcome of the uprisings (Börzel et al. 2015), dampening its enthusiasm for 
the changes taking place. This study looks in detail at the implications of the EU’s post-2011 revision 
of its security “cooperation” with Tunisia and Morocco for two aspects of the relationship. First, it 
looks at the way in which domestic political reconfigurations have occurred, if at all, among domestic 
political actors and how these reconfigurations have influenced relations with the EU. Second, it 
explores the asymmetries of power between the two parties and the degree of ‘leverage’ Tunisia and 
Morocco have vis-à-vis the EU. In order to do so, we employ a borderlands approach (Del Sarto 2010; 
2014). This frame is useful because it permits analyses of the ways in which the EU outsources the 
management of key ‘border functions’ such as migration while at the same time attempting to connect 
the periphery to the core in other areas, specifically economic policy. Thus, rather than looking at the 
whole of the relationship with one or more countries on the southern bank to then deliver a stark 
normative assessment of the relationship pointing to the dissonance between normativity and 
realpolitik, through the notion of “interconnectedness” (Cassarino 2005), we explore the mechanisms 
through which different policy areas are connected or disconnected. In turn, this allows us to 
                                                     
*
 We are very grateful for the comments the anonymous referees provided us with. We are indebted to Raffaella Del Sarto 
for her advice and for guiding this project through. Research for this paper was conducted in the framework of the 
BORDERLANDS Project, funded by the European Research Council under grant agreement number 263277. The project 
is hosted at the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, and directed by Raffaella 
A. Del Sarto. 
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problematise the relationship and how it operates according to functional areas of interaction, 
highlighting once again the notion of ambiguity of borders that Smith (2005) had pointed to after the 
launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
The EU borderlands after the Arab Awakening 
As Del Sarto implies in her work on EU external policies towards its periphery, it is necessary to think 
of what the EU does externally away from traditional conceptions of international politics and, 
crucially, away from the rather trite thinking that the EU is borderless within and a fortress without. 
First, the EU is not necessarily borderless from within because the Schengen regime does not apply to 
all members. Second, Schengen can be temporarily suspended and/or taken advantage of when 
member states deem it important to achieve their own national objectives, as the refugee crisis of 
autumn 2015 demonstrates. This multiplicity of movable ‘borders’ is captured, in Del Sarto’s analysis, 
with the term ‘variable geometry of borders’. The EU is also not a fortress from without, as there has 
been over time a transfer of border functions to countries outside the EU. These countries have been 
outsourced significant policy areas that are nominally internal EU ones. As Del Sarto (2010: 156) 
makes clear, ‘with regard to North Africa and the Middle East, stronger cooperation on the issues of 
migration, drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism has been witnessing the externalisation of 
EU internal policies over the last decade.’ All these issues form the core of what the EU conceives of 
as security, which is therefore better achieved by delegating specific functions outside the Union. This 
process of externalisation of a number of policy functions related to security has had considerable 
impact on both the EU and the countries at the periphery, as the notion of ‘fuzzy borders’ described by 
Christiansen et al (2000). What however has been less analysed is that this process of externalisation 
can also be subject to significant problems once potentially dramatic changes take place in the 
peripheral countries, because delegated functions could become contested. The uprisings in Tunisia 
and Morocco constituted such an occurrence. When domestic changes occur in the periphery, the way 
in which EU partners accept and work within the functions delegated to them might change as well, as 
new domestic constituencies manage to secure control of the levers of power, bringing with them 
alternative ideas about whether and how to collaborate with the EU. In turn, this might disrupt how the 
EU regulates and profits from functional outsourcing. This policy-structure means that the ‘distinction 
between inside and outside is disaggregated according to different functional areas and becomes 
blurred as a result’ (Del Sarto 2010: 150), highlighting specific mechanisms of policy-making that can 
be considered at the same time domestic and international. The consequences of this have to be 
analysed.  
First, the way in which the borderlands operate has something important to say about the nature of 
the EU and how it acts externally. The EU emerges as a pragmatic actor, aware of its geographical 
surroundings and of the specificities of its partners in the periphery. The EU is also conscious of the 
functions that should or should not be delegated in order to extract maximum benefits from them in 
the context of the broader objectives. Realistic about the impossibility of operating simply inside the 
fortress to promote its interests and values, the EU has opted to externalise specific border functions to 
achieve two goals. On the one hand, it hopes to leave the ‘dirty work’ necessarily associated with 
specific functional practices of border control – i.e. the setting up of detention centres for illegal 
migrants or repatriation practices – to countries formally outside its jurisdiction, where concerns for 
international legal standards and human rights are far from being a priority. On the other hand, the 
outsourcing of functions would inevitably draw countries of the periphery within the web of formal 
rules and regulations that characterise the EU with its association to the rule of law, democratic 
oversight and liberal rights. In this sense, the EU could argue that a certain degree of osmosis takes 
place, slowly transforming ‘problematic’ countries into more respectable partners and that this in turn 
would increase in the future the efficacy of the delegated functions, as well as the normative values 
underpinning them.  
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Second, and crucial for this study, the EU’s outsourcing of specific functions has an impact on the 
resources – material and moral – domestic actors in the periphery can deploy in their struggle with 
rivals. It is at this juncture that the literature on the international-domestic linkages becomes relevant 
in so far as the material and legitimacy resources external actors provide to domestic ones can have a 
powerful effect on domestic arrangements (Yilmaz 2002; Cavatorta 2009; Bush 2015). As the 
literature on democratisation and authoritarian survival has found, external ‘intervention’ or 
sponsorship provide resources to domestic actors interacting with each other to determine the outcome 
of institutional structures and such resources are influential in tipping the domestic balance of power 
in favour of some actors and to the detriment of others (Haynes 2003; Levitsky and Way 2010; 
Brownlee 2012). When domestic upheaval occurs, though, a redistribution of power and resources also 
occurs, with new institutional structures potentially leading previously marginalised political actors to 
power. This has significant implications for the external and internal arrangements in place. How the 
EU supports or undermines different actors at such crucial moments influences the nature of such 
domestic arrangements (Putnam 1988).  
Beginning in 2010, upheaval has visited all the countries in North Africa, although they have 
experienced very different political trajectories since then. While in some cases it might still make 
sense to focus on the MENA governments as unitary actors with very well defined interests and policy 
positions, in other cases this is more problematic. The cases of Tunisia and Morocco are very different 
from each other, with the former experiencing the collapse of the old system and the creation of a new 
one and the latter simply going through a process of authoritarian renewal (Benchmesi 2012; 
Dalmasso 2012). Following from this, it should be expected that the functional outsourced areas of 
policy-making in Tunisia would come under greater scrutiny– and challenge – domestically, due to the 
nature of the radical institutional changes that have taken place in the country. This would be even 
more so in the case if actors traditionally critical of EU foreign policy were to acquire the levers of 
power. Conversely, it should also be expected that Morocco would not represent a case of challenge 
for the agreements of the EU with the Kingdom regarding security, given the institutional continuity 
and the absence of new political actors outside the control of the monarchy coming to power. In short, 
the domestic game should be affected when institutions change and this in turn should have 
implications for international arrangements. Thus, the external actor – in this case the EU – would 
attempt to secure the same beneficial position it had before changes took place, investing resources in 
domestic actors that would represent its interests. This dynamic relationship between domestic actors 
and the EU is the core of this empirical study conducted on Tunisia and Morocco after the uprisings.  
Studies conducted before the Arab Spring suggested that material and legitimacy resources were 
cleverly leveraged by North African regimes capable of taking advantage of the ‘distress’ and fears of 
the EU on the key issues of terrorism and migration (Hollis 2009; Durac and Cavatorta 2009). The 
second interesting question therefore to explore is about the change that might have occurred in the 
bilateral relations between the EU and individual MENA countries. On the one hand, it might be 
argued that increased volatility at the EU borders has in fact augmented the leverage MENA countries 
can exercise. The fear of extremism, political instability, increased migration and a general feeling of 
loss of control of the southern periphery might work even more to the advantage of the countries to 
which crucial functional areas have been outsourced. They can ask for more in these more dangerous 
times. On the other hand, it might be argued that more open and pluralistic polities – Tunisia having 
become such a polity - produce a type of democratic governance where information is circulated 
freely, where assessment of potential threats is conducted openly and where therefore more ‘sincere’ 
relations exist. The leverage through fear might not work because the information about what is 
happening is much more freely available and ‘blackmail’ no longer routinely employed. In addition, 
domestic actors previously labelled as dangerous and used for scaremongering might be now part of 
the new political system, diminishing thus blackmailing potential. Islamist parties are a case in point. 
However, one has to consider that domestic volatility might undermine this assumption. In the cases of 
Morocco and Tunisia, the issue of leverage depends on the nature of domestic arrangements, but also 
on the perceptions of threats. When these are believed to be significant, but not vital, as in the case of 
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Morocco, leverage can still be employed vis à vis the external actor because the regime’s stability is 
assured in any case. In the case of Tunisia, though, the threats have been perceived as vital by the 
majority of Tunisian actors because of the volatility of the political situation and the absence of 
continuity, which suggests that key domestic actors can lead them to bow to external pressures more 
promptly, in so far as the external actors are unsure both of the stability of the country and the 
commitment of certain actors to it.  
The analysis of the cases of Tunisia and Morocco is helpful in disentangling such complexity and 
in providing an answer to both sets of questions.  
Tunisia and the EU after the fall of authoritarianism 
Bourguiba’s and then Ben Ali’s authoritarian pragmatism was the linchpin of what was a fairly well 
established relationship between Tunisia and Europe (Hibou 1999). The ‘stability’ of authoritarian rule 
seemed to serve the EU well in terms of guaranteeing security (Powel and Sadiki 2010) and such a 
focus on it on the part of the EU has not shifted much after the fall of Ben Ali. If anything, EU 
concerns over the volatility of the Tunisian transition and its problematic regional surroundings – 
notably the civil war in Libya - heightened security fears.  
The first part of this section describes the development of the security functional regime, which is 
made up of increasingly interconnected actors and has a normative framework establishing 
cooperation priorities. The contention here is that the institutional architecture framing and supporting 
the borderlands builds upon a process falling outside Mediterranean dynamics. The joint agenda seems 
to barely take into account the local political conditions and domestic reconfigurations of power; at the 
most they are understood through the lenses of the EU rather than from different domestic points of 
view. In this respect, political cooperation priorities tend to be more in line with EU imperatives than 
Tunisia’s. This means, for instance, that partner countries like Tunisia are asked to ‘police’ borders 
that are actually quite far from the Mediterranean basin, to include countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
with all the associated costs - material and diplomatic. For some Tunisian actors, notably the Islamists 
and sectors of civil society, the requirements of EU cooperation on security-related matters were 
particularly costly and should have been revised. It was precisely these actors that emerged as 
powerful in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Ben Ali. The European quest for consistency and 
coherence of its external action shaped however the architecture of cooperation far more than political 
developments in the region, featuring a strong inward-looking approach. Hence, notwithstanding 
domestic changes in partner countries and the policy instrument chosen for the partnership, there is 
continuity in the EU approach towards security and the way cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) is organised. 
The second part of this section focuses on the way in which specific JHA policies are implemented, 
to look at the impact of institutionalised cooperation on the domestic level as well as on Tunisian 
leverage in the relationship. The dynamics between the EU and Tunisia should have theoretically 
changed following the Tunisian revolution with a redefinition of priorities more favourable to the new 
Tunisian regime, particularly because political and social actors previously critical of Tunisia’s 
relationship with the EU played a prominent post-revolutionary role. This however has not been the 
case and quite the contrary has occurred.  
The construction of the borderland: institutionalising cooperation on security 
Until 9/11, security was not a cornerstone of EU-Tunisia relations. Unlike counterterrorism 
cooperation with Algeria, dating back to 1992, (Entelis and Arone 1992; Jünemann 2004) a specific 
chapter on JHA was not included in the EU-Tunisia Association Agreement that President Ben Ali 
signed in 1995. Two articles on money laundering and on drug trafficking appeared in the section 
dedicated to economic cooperation, while migration was only touched on when addressing dialogue on 
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social affairs. Tunisia seemed to embody the normative approach to security of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, based on the liberal assumption that prosperity and tightened commercial 
relations would bring peace and stability (Joffé 2008; Pace and Seeberg 2013). 
Security was certainly a domestic priority for Tunisia however and the emphasis on it was 
instrumental to the legitimising discourse of the regime. Building on the legacy of President 
Bourguiba’s “zero enemy diplomacy” (IACE, 2014), Ben Ali sought to use security as a bargaining 
chip to negotiate with the EU and to diversify foreign policy partners. This suggests that security was a 
concern that Tunisia brought to the table at the beginning of the partnership, although the conception 
of security Ben Ali had in mind was the survival of his own authoritarian regime, conflated with the 
security of the state. This is important to underline because the de-coupling of security of the state and 
security of the regime will have implications in the aftermath of the revolution in 2011, when security 
threats to the state became both serious and legitimate in the context of regional chaos.   
Nevertheless, as the EU Member States (MS) had no perception of facing a common threat, JHA 
issues remained the preserve of bilateral agreements. At the EU level, the question of security was 
addressed in the Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Med Conferences (Balzacq 2009), but Tunisia 
neither had sufficient regional standing nor presented such a major Islamist menace to urge a strong 
EU security strategy. This is also the reason why Tunisia became the flagship country for the EU 
approach to democratisation (Cavatorta and Durac 2013) and the transformation of the EU-Tunisia 
border into “a hybrid area of transition” (Del Sarto 2014). 
The institutionalisation of the security regime intensified with the launch of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), whose architecture mirrored the post 2001 EU security turn and the 
significant policy shift outlined in the 2003 European Security Strategy (European Council, 2003). 
The Action Plan signed by Tunisia in 2004 was far more detailed than the previous agreement with 
regards to JHA issues with headings fully committed to tackle terrorism: economic and financial 
crimes, money laundering, drugs and corruption, through bilateral, regional, police and judicial 
cooperation, by means of the MEDA programme (the main financial instrument towards the Southern 
neighbourhood), the AENEAS programme on migration, and the Governance Facility and 
Neighbourhood Investment Fund.  
According to the Euro-Mediterranean institutional structure, priorities were supposed to be 
examined within the Association Councils and Committees, the former representing the ministerial 
level and the latter formed by European and Tunisian senior officials. 
Furthermore, six subcommittees – the technical level of negotiation that had been somewhat 
disregarded in the implementation of the Association Agreement - were created in 2003 to formalise 
the institutional structure of the relations (EU-Tunisia Association Council, 2005). Among them was a 
subcommittee dealing with justice and security (interview with an EU official, Tunis, March 2014). 
Thus, after the 1996-1999 phase of stasis, European and Tunisian Ministers met quite regularly, 
although sub-committees and working groups functioned only sporadically (no meeting on justice and 
security was held until 2008). An analysis of the minutes of the Association Councils confirms the EU 
attempt to re-prioritize its strategy towards security, namely terrorism and migration. Thus, whilst the 
EU Presidency’s introductory speeches often addressed security issues first, Tunisian Foreign 
Ministers focused more on economic and financial cooperation. This was partly due to Ben Ali’s 
intention to avoid the human rights issue, often linked to JHA, and partly to the awareness that the EU 
soft approach offered technical assistance or training rather than equipment for security forces, which 
was the kind of support the Tunisian government was looking for – and obtained bilaterally from 
member states. In some ways the focus on economic and financial cooperation on the part of the 
Tunisian regime suggests, as mentioned above, that the EU was not considered a primary partner on 
hard security matters. It also leads one to think that the Tunisian regime felt reasonably secure and that 
perceived threats to it were more a bargaining chip than the reality.  
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Overall, what is worth noting here is that an increasingly institutionalised framework went along 
with the shift in the Mediterranean strategy and that a “process of co-optation of North African elites, 
while excluding them from Brussels’ decision-making” (Del Sarto 2010:150), was pursued. Increasing 
contacts, be they formal or informal, especially with the Presidency and the Ministry of Interior of 
Tunisia, within or on the margins of the joint management arena, contributed to shaping the security 
regime.  
At the Tunisian domestic level, policymaking and bilateral cooperation, particularly in the field of 
JHA, remained essentially within the remit of the Tunisian President and the Ministry of Interior. They 
housed the whole security apparatus, which was made up of the Public Order Brigade or riot police, 
the State Security Department, and many other elite units, among them the presidential guard (Kartas 
2014). Well-trained cadres of European Commission technocrats backed Ben Ali’s machinery, 
attending joint negotiations and participating in the very few JHA joint initiatives actually 
implemented under the ENP. It is little wonder that this irked the genuine opposition, be it either 
Islamist or secular, and hence, when the revolution occurred, a re-evaluation of the relationship had to 
be expected.  
The governance structure, which is meant to fulfil the joint-ownership principle underlying the 
ENP (European Commission 2004), gradually consolidated a well-functioning and stable network 
between the EU and Tunisia. If interconnectedness granted more leeway to North African countries 
with the EU and its Member States, as Cassarino (2005) puts it, rather effective leverage was ensured 
by the centralised and repressive system of Ben Ali. 
The post 2011 Neighbourhood Policy followed on from the ENP
1
, echoing the European quest for 
more “dialogue on governance, security and conflict resolution” (European Commission, 2011). The 
EU-Tunisia Action Plan, signed in November 2012 after many negotiation rounds carried out by four 
consecutive Tunisian governments, elaborated on the security priorities including a reference to the 
Mobility Partnership, the new political tool for migration and mobility, developed since 2007 and 
negotiated with the Tunisian transition government until March 2014. This new policy instrument, 
which is intended to frame, foster and partly ‘communitarize’ the management of migration through 
an overarching, non-binding agreement, comes to further institutionalise the security issue area. 
The 2013 Association Committee
2
 indicates that security was a priority also for post-revolutionary 
Tunisia and that the new ruling elites were willing to cooperate on border management and the 
exchange of information. Nevertheless, it no longer represented a bargaining chip in Tunisia’s foreign 
policy, as was the case before. The arrival in power of political actors that had developed a different 
conception of security for Tunisia and the degree of inevitable volatility in the aftermath of radical 
institutional changes meant that, for a time, the domestic debate on how to pursue cooperation with the 
EU was highly politicised and hotly contested (International Crisis Group, 2014), drifting between 
state and human security. In fact, this speaks to the divide that emerged in Tunisia between 
‘securocrats’ with old reflexes – in line with the dominant thinking during Ben Ali’s time - and 
activists/politicians pushing for rethinking cooperation with the EU. After the revolution, the new 
ruling elites – Islamists and human rights advocates in particular – questioned specific aspects of 
Tunisian foreign-policy making towards the EU, leading many to expect that Tunisia would be much 
harder to negotiate with, and exposing previous functional arrangements with the EU to profound 
changes in the relationship. This however did not occur, for three reasons.  
                                                     
1
 The political agreement on the Privileged Partnership between Tunisia and the EU, sealed during the 2012 Association 
Council, builds on the agreement reached during the 8th Association Council, which was held in 2010 during Ben Ali’s 
era. 
2
 The 2013 Association Committee was the second bilateral meeting after Ben Ali’s fall, the first being the Association 
Council held in 2012 and attended by the then Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Rafik Abdessalem. 
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First, the new domestic elites became quickly aware that security concerns had not been entirely 
made up during Ben Ali’s time, but were in part genuine, with the presence of armed terrorist groups 
on the territory, and increasing transnational crime – usually linked to trafficking. This meant that the 
securocrats should still have had a say on how security policy was negotiated with external actors, 
when the initial reaction of the new actors in power was to completely marginalise them because of 
the repressive role they had played in Ben Ali’s time. Second the new institutional structures still left 
many officials from the previous regime in place and they had a degree of weight in decision-making 
about foreign policy issues and domestic security, thanks to their long-established linkages with EU 
and MS counterparts. Foreign security agencies, notably in Europe and the US, had forged strong ties 
with the Tunisian security apparatus and American and European governments discreetly encouraged 
the post-revolutionary political elites to take security seriously and to ‘re-admit’ the securocrats to 
policy-formulation. In addition, their weight and importance grew over time as the domestic 
enthusiasm for the revolution faded and demands for security emanating from ordinary Tunisian 
citizens reappeared. Finally, asymmetrical power in favour of the EU and the latter’s focus on hard 
security matters such as anti-terror cooperation contributed to legitimising the arguments securocrats 
put forth, providing them with the legitimacy and material resources to prevent a more meaningful 
rethink of what security means for Tunisia today and how best the EU can be a partner in that. The 
Tunisian redefinition and reprioritization of JHA proceeded slowly because of this overarching debate, 
and “the transition governments (did not) succeed in putting forward a consistent security policy 
proposal” (Interview with DCAF representative, 2014). However, the Islamists’ return into opposition, 
the terrorist attacks in Bardo and Sousse and the migration crisis have given substance to the EU’s 
arguments about the necessity of strengthening the functional areas Tunisia assists in, and the new 
Tunisian president Essebsi has taken that on board. The external regional environment contributed 
greatly to the domestic debate about security and to the ways in which the EU perceived and exploited 
it.  
Unlike during Ben Ali’s time, the security of the state had been decoupled from the security of the 
regime and therefore, all things being equal, one might have expected greater Tunisian resistance to 
the needs and requests of the EU. However, the post-2011 chaotic regional situation actually 
threatened the security of the state, making Tunisian resistance to some of the demands emanating 
from Brussels extremely difficult. Rather than democratisation contributing to re-direct the 
relationship with the EU away from the concerns that characterised the Ben Ali period, the messiness 
of the transition and genuine regional instability reinforced them. The EU profited from Tunisian 
divisions to emphasise its own security needs and inevitably empowered those in Tunisia having a 
similar discourse and understanding of the regional reality.  
The EU thus seems to have barely taken into account the volatility and the vulnerability of the 
country, proceeding instead to emphasise the need for increased anti-terrorism cooperation, for 
instance in its request for Tunisia to accept readmission. While rhetorically committed to tackle the 
issues that are seen as root causes of terrorism, the EU is quite open about ‘working with the Tunisian 
authorities to step up cooperation in the fight against the multiple aspects of terrorism, as part of its 
support for security sector reform and in accordance with the provisions of the new constitution as 
regards the rule of law and human rights’ (European Council, 2015).3 If it is in part too early to draw 
definite conclusions, it is fair to say that the framework of EU-Tunisia relations, at least for the near 
future, was set during the transition according to the EU timing and priorities. In addition, it relied on 
well-known and established Tunisian actors or institutions, particularly the securocrats within the 
Ministry of Interior, and since autumn 2014 on the Presidency. In this respect, this replicates what 
occurred during the Ben Ali era and there is the risk that the fight against terrorism might today, just as 
then, target social constituencies already disenfranchised from the political process.  
                                                     
3
 “President Donald Tusk and High Representative Federica Mogherini in Tunis to boost EU-Tunisia relations”, European 
Council press release, 29/03/2015.  
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In terms of the leverage Tunisia had, it could be argued that the governance approach (Lavenex et 
al. 2009; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009) in Tunisia might have narrowed it, thus increasing the 
asymmetry of the relationship, and contributing to shaping what many scholars call informal empire 
(Lake 2009; Lake 1999; Zielonka 2007). This is not because there has been a shift in domestic 
Tunisian dynamics away from the securocrats, who remain at the heart of Tunisian policy-making, 
having reasserted their primacy after having been marginalised in the early days of the transition to 
democracy. There is another post-Spring factor that can explain diminishing Tunisian leverage in 
Brussels – one may in fact speak of increasing convergence of preferences between the EU and 
Tunisia on security matters - in addition to the realisation that the regional situation, as explained 
above, seems to threaten the very stability of the state. The EU has become more concerned with the 
issue of hard security and counter-terrorism precisely because regional instability is perceived to be 
much greater than in the past, with countries on the periphery – Libya for instance – running the risk 
of becoming dangerous failed states. This greater insecurity makes the EU less willing to be 
cooperative and collaborative, preferring instead to impose its will even on partners. Admittedly 
Tunisia is not very reluctant, when it comes to security issues, to accept what Brussels proposes, 
because to an extent it chimes with its own domestic preferences, but it also means that the EU might 
not be willing to give as much in other domains as during the Ben Ali period.  
From this, it follows that institutionalised cooperation informing the governance of the borderland, 
as described above, tends to favour the implementation of EU priorities and limit Tunisian leeway. 
Furthermore, by relying on traditional and well-known channels and networks, this institutionalised 
cooperation might even undermine the reorganization of security actors into the state system. 
Reorganization is a demand that local actors have pushed for since the collapse of the regime, but 
external resources can empower security actors to withstand such demands because overhauling the 
system would destabilise international connections. In fact, the EU relies almost by default on well-
known actors such as the Ministry of Interior, and this provides such domestic actors with resources to 
play in their internal game, pitting them against other domestic actors and institutions that, when also 
involved in relations with the EU, find themselves in a weakened position.  
The preponderance of EU priorities in post-revolutionary EU-Tunisia dynamics is well illustrated 
by the signature in 2014 of the joint political declaration on migration, an issue fully part of the 
concept of security. The agreement on the Mobility Partnership, aimed at strengthening dialogue and 
cooperation on migration, mobility and security to promote the implementation of joint initiatives 
(EU, 2014) came in late 2013, at a time of political stalemate in Tunisia, and was not a priority of the 
transition government. The critical stance of civil society organisations
4
 against what was perceived as 
the “hidden externalization of European borders”, particularly referring to the readmission of third 
country nationals clause, was boosting dissent towards the establishment and rocking an already 
unstable boat (Interviews with CSO representatives 2013 and 2014). Nonetheless, negotiations on 
migration and mobility entered the joint agenda as early as October 2011, including dialogue with 
European borders agency FRONTEX and the European Police Office EUROPOL, to conclude a 
working arrangement and a reinforced partnership with the latter. The government of Tunisia certainly 
needed and craved international legitimacy and was therefore open to pressure, but the EU pushed 
very hard on these matters (Limam and Del Sarto 2015). The timing and process of negotiations were 
firmly in the hands of the EU. Tunisian concerns about cross-pillar consequences of the stalemate on 
the mobility track, for instance in terms of 55 million Euros freeze under the SPRING Programme, 
together with political uncertainty, strongly limited Tunisian leverage on a highly contested 
agreement. Notwithstanding some attempts to resist, which led to a cosmetic adjustment of the 
wording, the readmission clause was also included in the declaration. Indeed, instead of the explicit 
                                                     
4
 Further information on the position of major human rights organisations active in Tunisia on the political declaration can 
be found on the official websites of the Forum International des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), Migreurop Observatoire 
des Frontières, and Euromediterranean Human Rights Network.  
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reference to third-country nationals, article 9 states that cooperation on readmission will be developed 
according to the EU standards in this domain. 
The step back by the Ministry of Interior - which had blocked until then any advance on the 
migration and mobility tracks, as well as any collaboration with FRONTEX- from its traditional role 
of last resort negotiator was a novelty, both in the internal balance of power (especially with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and in EU-Tunisia dynamics. 
More traditional security and JHA cooperation is progressing slowly and very few initiatives were 
launched after the revolution. As highlighted before and during the 2014 elections, security remained a 
priority of the country, but polarisation of concerns was kept high and prevented thorough discussions 
about the way in which security sector reform (SSR) should be implemented, as well as a critical 
reflection on the linkages between the whole security apparatus and the previous regime. As reported 
by a member of the Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) working in the 
Assistance Programme to Tunisia, “the shift from state to human security has not been tackled from a 
political point of view. There is no clear political input yet and the involvement in support 
programmes ends up affecting individuals rather than the security corps” (Interview with DCAF 
representative, 2014). The Tunisian request for including SSR in the bilateral agenda was accepted by 
the EU, but most of the activities were carried out by either the MS or other actors such as the DCAF, 
or the 5+5 dialogue on defence. If this is partly due to the distribution of competences established by 
the Treaties, weak prioritization of wide approaches to security by the EU is also part of the problem. 
As the European Parliament already pointed out with regards to Libya in 2012: “it is regrettable that 
the EU contribution in the security sector is slow to materialize, and that difficulties in planning and 
implementing this contribution are leaving the field open to bilateral initiatives of doubtful visibility 
and consistency” (European Parliament, 2012). 
Several EU funded experts’ missions in the field of border management and control were carried 
out in 2013 and resulted in a report that is supposed to be endorsed by Tunisian authorities (EU 
Council, 2014), as well as training sessions planned by the EUROMED III-Police and EUROMED III-
Justice programmes. However, neither new Tunisian actors nor new instruments or priorities entered 
the framework of interactions. Preferential bilateral channels were kept, such as those of the Tunisian 
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence, ministries which are also 
responsible for selecting the personnel attending the joint initiatives, while civil society 
representatives, unions and syndicates of the security sector feel “neglected by EU” (Interviews with 
one representative of the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme and two representatives of the 
union SNFSI, 2014). The EU endorsed lessons from the uprisings and tried to strengthen its 
relationship with CSOs, but as an EEAS official put it, “mutual knowledge and empowerment take 
time, while the cooperation machinery is already settled, at least for the near future, and must go on” 
(Interview with an officer of the EU Delegation, 2013). 
Therefore, the impact on domestic actors in times of transition is twofold. First, securocrats, while 
having been (re)-empowered domestically in their confrontation with other actors with diverging 
agendas and conceptions of security, are unable to exercise the same degree of leverage they had, 
during Ben Ali’s period, over the EU. Thus, they tend to rely more on the cooperation with the MS or 
within multilateral arenas “wherein they feel more equal” (Interview with a representative of the 
Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 
, 2013), and where funding for equipment and infrastructure can 
be obtained. It should also be highlighted that diminishing leverage might not capture entirely the 
current dynamics, because, as mentioned already, there is also a degree of convergence of security 
preferences between Tunisia and the EU more generally. Second, new actors struggle through the 
institutionalised and well-rooted framework for cooperation to put forward their demands or, as Kartas 
(2014) argues, they bypass and resist the reforms to look for autonomy.  
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Morocco and the EU after the Spring 
Morocco provides an interesting counter-case to Tunisia because the trajectory of Morocco has been 
considerably different after protests began in February 2011. Following on from the example of 
Tunisia, young Moroccans began organizing demonstrations against the government. Just like their 
counterparts across the region, their anger was directed at officials seemingly unable to deal with 
corruption, inequality and authoritarianism. Three elements are worthy of note in the Moroccan 
protests of early 2011. First of all they were widespread and large across the entire country. Second, 
protesters were good at building cross-ideological coalitions and therefore made the demonstrations 
appealing to a vast network of associations and groups that usually fought their ‘battles’ alone. Finally, 
and crucially, the demonstrations did not directly target the monarchy. This last element is key to 
understanding both how the monarch responded to the demonstrations, and the concerns of vast 
swathes of Moroccan citizens who presumably shared the demands of the protesters, but did not join 
them in the streets. Rather than resorting to repression, the monarch stated that he shared the concerns 
of the street, made them his own and proceeded to overhaul the constitution to set up a more 
responsive institutional structure. With the support of political parties, Mohammed VI launched a 
consultative process on the reform of the constitution, which was approved by popular referendum a 
few months after the protests had begun. The ability of the monarch to seize the initiative pre-empted 
the growth of the protest movement and ultimately ensured its demise. To most citizens it appeared 
that the monarch had acceded to the demands of the protesters and that the newly elected government, 
which came to power in late 2011, should be allowed to govern. These moves contributed to the 
collapse of the protest movement and reasserted monarchical primacy without fundamentally altering 
the political system. By pretending to listen to the protestors, the monarch had the time to devise a 
successful strategy of survival. In short, the monarch ‘outfoxed’ the genuine opposition (Benchemsi 
2012; Dalmasso 2012). The new constitutional text did not in reality meet any of the expectations of 
change that the street had, and a close analysis of the wording suggests a high degree of continuity 
with the past (Madani et al 2012). Theophilipolou (2012: 694) sums up the scholarly consensus on the 
new constitution when she writes that it ‘has not resulted in a constitutional monarchy, real separation 
of powers, accountability by those in charge, the King abandoning his sacredness, the prime minister 
enjoying new constitutional powers and an end to Morocco’s clientelist system of government.’ The 
20 February protest movement suffered over time from decreasing unity within its ranks – notably the 
split between the Islamist Justice and Charity Group and secular associations - and from its inability to 
connect with Moroccans outside urban centres (Bergh and Rossi-Doria 2015). The ability of the 
monarch to co-opt political parties (Szmolka 2015) and segments of civil society led to the survival 
and entrenchment of monarchical authoritarian rule. It is clear therefore that Morocco has followed a 
radically different trajectory from the one Tunisia experienced and provides a different test case for 
EU external policy-making following the Arab Spring. 
Morocco has long been a privileged partner for the EU (Volpi 2010) and in some ways it has also 
been a linchpin in the EU strategy of institutionalising a viable borderland in the Mediterranean, as the 
country has always been deemed stable and reasonably democratic, which made it easier for the EU to 
cooperate with. This notion of Morocco as a liberal country has been challenged (Graciet and Laurent 
2012), but the EU has recognized consistently that Morocco was a ‘good’ student of democratisation 
and economic integration into the free trade area the EU promoted since the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. Given the radically different trajectory Morocco followed compared to Tunisia after the 
uprisings, the expectation is that the relations between Morocco and the EU would not have 
dramatically shifted, and would be in fact characterised by continuity in all of their most important 
aspects. This would suggest two considerations. First, moral and material external resources provided 
by the EU contribute to maintain the political status quo and preserve the monarch’s grip on power. 
Second, and unlike the ‘new’ Tunisia, the ability Morocco has to withstand some of the pressure the 
EU applies on the countries of the borderlands has remained reasonably intact because of its 
institutional continuity. While the new Tunisian elites have had to contend with the volatility of their 
process of democratisation and with an extremely unstable regional environment that impacts directly 
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on the country’s politics, such as the Libyan civil war or trafficking at the border with Algeria, 
Morocco, due to monarchical stability, is much better equipped to deal with crises and does not suffer 
as much from the spill-over effects of regional instability. The Tunisian elites have less room for 
manoeuvre than Morocco, when it comes to its security cooperation with the EU.  
On the political front, it is clear that the EU did not face the same short-term dilemmas that it had 
when thinking about its relations with Tunisia after the fall of the Ben Ali regime. First of all, no new 
political players emerged during the demonstrations. Unlike in Tunisia therefore there was no state 
withdrawal or collapse, nor a broader questioning of the repressive structures of the state. There was 
no real contestation of rules and rulers and there was therefore no sense of volatility or rapid change to 
contend with. In fact the ability of the King to dominate the political system and pre-empt challenges 
to his rule, while at the same time appearing to move the country forward on the path of 
democratisation, strengthened his standing with European officials, who were more than happy to 
provide him with praise and political support. In short, when it comes to Morocco, the Arab Spring has 
not changed what the EU does in terms of political support for the monarchy. The more interesting 
aspect of the relationship has thus to do with its continuity, with both parties determined to deepen 
their economic linkages while maintaining their divergences on security cooperation. On the economic 
front, it is as if the nature of demonstrations in Morocco was either misunderstood or ignored by both 
Moroccan and EU officials. The Association Agreement that had entered into force in 2000 provided 
for the creation of a genuine Free Trade Area between the EU and Morocco. Despite the uprisings, 
two parties launched negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in 2013, 
with very little sense that the demonstrations openly criticised the consequences of economic openings 
perceived to be benefitting only the few, to the detriment of the working conditions and living 
standards of the many (Colombo 2011; Bogaert 2015). In addition to the negotiations over DCFTA, 
the controversial EU-Morocco Agreement on agricultural, processed agricultural and fisheries 
products entered into force 1st October 2012. Both speak to ‘continuity’ rather than change in the 
relationship.  
On security matters, Morocco was always identified as a priority partner, as its ‘advanced status’ in 
the European Neighbourhood Policy confirms. As the EU officially states,  
‘the advanced status is reflected in the willingness to strengthen political dialogue, co-operation in 
the economic, social, parliamentary, judicial and security fields and in different sectors, namely 
agriculture, transportation, energy and environment. It also aims at the progressive integration of 
Morocco into the common internal market as well as at increasing legislative and regulatory 
convergence. Financial co-operation plays an essential support role for the success of this status.’ 
(EEAS, 2014) 
The negotiations on advanced status had led the working group to suggest the following, among 
others, be included in the final accord: the creation of an institute for the fight against crime; 
Moroccan participation in training and seminars at the European College of Police and a dialogue on 
the fight against drugs. However, on hard security matters not much was discussed, particularly in 
terms of the fight against terrorism, because Morocco has a privileged relationship with the United 
States and individual member-states such as Spain. As Thompson and McCants (2013: 1-2) note: 
‘the bilateral relationship is particularly strong in areas of military and law enforcement 
cooperation… The United States … conducts training for Moroccan security and law enforcement 
personnel. In return, Morocco aids the United States with gathering intelligence, interdicting 
contraband and criminals, and formulating responses to regional terrorist threats. One area of 
frequent cooperation between the two countries is counterterrorism (CT)—a collaboration that the 
U.S. State Department has characterized as “robust.” One of the most fruitful programs…has been 
Morocco’s participation in the longstanding Antiterrorism Assistance Program.’  
Thus, on the question of terrorism, Morocco has always been less committed to deepening the 
relationship with the EU as a whole, preferring instead strong bilateral relations with key member 
states. The relationship between Spain and Morocco is illustrative of this. In a recent analysis of the 
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relationship between the two countries, Reinares and Garcia-Calvo (2015) highlight how over thirty 
years anti-terrorism cooperation has solidified into a genuine partnership that is essential for Spain in 
its fight against jihadism. The authors emphasise that close bilateral cooperation, such as the 
establishment of a Spanish special magistrate in Rabat following cases of terrorism, is very effective. 
To this, it is worth noting, they argue, that ‘between 2013 and 2014 the Moroccan and Spanish police 
led jointly a number of anti-terror operation that resulted in over 40 arrests on both sides of the border: 
Operación Cesto (June-September 2013), Operación Azteca (March 2014), Operación Gala (June 
2014), Operación Kibera (August 2014 and December 2014) and Operación Farewell (September 
2014). A degree of cooperation of this kind is also envisaged within the EU-Morocco twelfth 
Association Council held in Brussels in December 2014, but the reality is that cooperation is mostly at 
the rhetorical level. This preference for bilateral relations and the ability to hold out on this indicate 
that Morocco has still leverage to employ vis à vis the EU. In a 2010 analysis of Morocco’s approach 
to the issue of migration linked to security issues with the EU, for instance, El Qadim (2010: 93) 
argues that ‘European countries exercise strong pressure on the countries in the southern bank of the 
Mediterranean for a stricter migratory policy, but the benefits that countries in the Maghreb have 
obtained during the negotiations have been important…especially for Morocco.’ Much more recently, 
the EU foreign affairs representatives stated that when it came to security – particularly anti terrorism 
– the EU needed Morocco more than the other way around (El-Ouardighi, 2015), suggesting that 
leverage on the Moroccan side has been maintained in spite of the demonstrations. However, when the 
analysis shifts to this very specific issue of migration, the EU has been able to make some progress 
following the uprisings. Within the broader EU security framework illegal migration is a salient issue 
for the EU. For a number of years the bone of contention between Morocco and the EU in the fight 
against illegal immigration – a crucial aspect of border security for the EU - has been ‘readmission’ of 
third country nationals expelled from the EU. Morocco had always refused to countenance and 
validate readmission, largely because of domestic politics concerns. As mentioned, the EU and 
Morocco have cooperated on migration issues for some years through the framework of the Euro-
African conference in 2006 and the Union for the Mediterranean, but readmission was always resisted. 
A more comprehensive Mobility Partnership has been signed though in June 2013. The declaration 
includes an explicit reference to readmission of third country nationals (EU, 2013)
5
, signalling that 
cooperation progressed on that issue, despite the criticism coming from human rights activists. As the 
European human rights network (2013) stated in the aftermath of the signature,  
‘in view of the current situation in Morocco, a readmission agreement would entail serious risks in 
terms of respect for the rights of migrants and refugees, and would expose them to the risk of 
inhuman and degrading treatment. In fact, both civil society organisations in Morocco as well as 
the Moroccan National Council for Human Rights have denounced the fate of sub-Saharans 
“blocked” in Morocco. The criminalisation of irregular immigration, as contained in the Moroccan 
Law 02-03, the absence of an effective asylum system and the xenophobic climate hostile to 
migrants… are all real issues that the signatory parties cannot ignore’ (Euro-Med Human Rights 
Network, 2014).  
What is important to underline here is that the ability Morocco had to withstand EU pressure for a 
readmission agreement seems to have faded, given the explicit reference to readmission which had for 
so long been refused. The theoretical expectation that regime continuity in Morocco would allow the 
kingdom to exercise leverage and withstand pressure from the EU for unwanted policies such as 
readmission is not quite met. This might indicate that the EU, in light of the almost unprecedented 
regional instability it faces on the southern bank, has pressurized Morocco sufficiently to gain a 
significant diplomatic victory, at least at the rhetorical level. This is because signature and 
implementation remain very different stages, with the latter not necessarily taking place in the way in 
which it is conceived in the official documents both parties signed. This should not however obscure 
                                                     
5
 Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of Morocco and the EU and its Member 
States (EU, 2013)  
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that, at the same time, Morocco has been able to win out on other negotiating tables, including the 
renewal of the agreement on fishing rights, which implicitly recognises Moroccan sovereignty in 
Western Sahara, a crucial foreign policy issue for the Kingdom. Through the Mobility Partnership, the 
EU has been able to further outsource, on paper, ambiguous practices of immigration control to 
Moroccan authorities, which are not known for their respect for human rights. In some ways it is a 
mutually beneficial balance which is enhanced by the provision that ‘the EU and Morocco have 
committed to encouraging the mobility of Moroccan citizens’, although ‘it should be noted that the 
proposals above all reflect the interests of the EU to facilitate entrance and residence only for highly 
skilled persons’ (Euro-Med Human Rights Network, 2014).  
The issue of continuity in the aftermath of the uprisings has been the crucial one in EU-Morocco 
relations on security. EU support for the monarchy has not faded; if anything it has solidified in light 
of the stability the regime is able to project (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2012) While the EU has made 
some gains regarding migration, the leverage of Morocco has not decreased and Moroccan ruling 
elites know they can count on the resources the EU places at their disposal.  
Conclusion 
As Börzel et al (2015) made clear, not much seems to have changed in the relationship between the 
EU and Mediterranean countries following the Arab Spring. The soul-searching and reflective mode of 
EU officials was short-lived and did not really produce any significant change in everyday practices. 
The rhetoric about past mistakes and new beginnings in the early days of the uprisings has not been 
matched over time and, as enthusiasm for the Arab Spring faded on both sides of the Mediterranean, 
the EU reverted to a business as usual approach. In fact, it could even be argued that the intensity and 
scale of the crises unfolding across the Arab world has led the EU to further entrench its isolationist 
position, demand greater cooperation on security matters to Arab regimes – whether new as in Tunisia 
or old as in Morocco – and make sure that the functions delegated to them are implemented. This 
setting up of a borderlands regime, where a number of security matters are outsourced to 
Mediterranean partners in order to ‘enlarge’ the area of EU security, has not been modified after the 
uprisings. From counter-terrorism to de-radicalization strategies and from migration to trafficking, the 
EU demands and usually obtains the cooperation of both Tunisia and Morocco, irrespective of the 
diverging post-uprising trajectories of the two countries. In fact, as Del Sarto (2015: 1) makes clear, 
‘through the transfer of rules and practices beyond its borders, the EU is indeed engaged in 
‘normative’ policies, which however primarily serve the security and economic interests of the EU and 
its Member States.’ For this reason it has been possible to continue the development of the borderland 
in the security issue-area broadly along the same lines before and after the Arab uprisings: that is 
towards an increasingly institutionalised framework with normative contours, but serving material 
interests. The comparative analysis of the Tunisian and Moroccan cases shows that, on the one hand, 
such a constraining framework applied to asymmetric relations provides leverage to stable and well 
organized third countries (as was the case with Ben Ali’s Tunisia) when the regional situation is 
reasonably stable and predictable. On the other hand, when volatility and instability intensified, both 
post-uprising Tunisia and Morocco suffered from greater limits to their negotiating power because the 
fear factor at EU level increased the asymmetry between the EU and its counterpart. Thus, the 
Tunisian transition has somewhat modified the relationship with the EU to the detriment of Tunis. 
Whereas the Ben Ali regime had been able at times to exert leverage on the EU, draw benefits from it 
and withstand pressure from the EU, the new authorities in Tunis have had much less success, 
precisely because the process of democratisation, volatile in itself, has been taking place in un 
unfavourable environment, which has quite quickly favoured the return of the securocrats. Despite the 
fact that the transition has meant an increase in the legitimacy of domestic players previously excluded 
from policy-making and brought to the surface their very different ideas about what security means 
and for whom it should be achieved, the coincidence of interests between domestic securocrats and the 
EU’s needs has prevailed in determining security arrangements. Morocco has experienced a very 
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different uprising, with the monarchy reasserting its power and with no genuine institutional change. 
The ability of the monarch to survive unscathed and even strengthened has meant that a much higher 
degree of continuity has characterized the relationship with the EU. Institutional continuity allowed 
the monarchy to almost completely insulate Morocco from increased EU pressure, although the EU 
was able to make small gains on migration matters and on increased economic linkages. For its part, 
the kingdom however has been able to continue to score important victories on other fronts, 
demonstrating its ability to withstand EU pressure on very important foreign policy issues. In any 
case, Morocco has fared better than Tunisia because of its privileged security cooperation with the US 
and because the Kingdom can still project an image of domestic stability that Western countries do not 
want to upset. The myth of stability no longer applies to Tunisia. This different picture confirms Del 
Sarto’s point about the variable geometry of borders and speaks to the complexity of the borderlands 
regime.  
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